Lineages of liberalism and miracles of modernisation: The World Bank, the East Asian trajectory and the international development debate by Berger, M.T. & Beeson, M.
MURDOCH RESEARCH REPOSITORY
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au
This is the author's final version of the work, as accepted for publication following peer review but without the
publisher's layout or pagination.
Berger, M.T. and Beeson, M. (1998) Lineages of liberalism and miracles of modernisation: The World
Bank, the East Asian trajectory and the international development debate. Third World Quarterly, 19 (3).
pp. 487-504.
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/18214
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted.
Lineages of liberalism and miracles of modernisation: 
The World Bank, the East Asian trajectory and the 
international development debate  
 
By Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson 
 
The crisis in East Asia has raised important questions both about the way in  
which the East Asian developmental trajectory has been understood and the 
relevance of the East Asian model to modernisation elsewhere in the world. Until 
recently the World Bank played an important role in encouraging the perception 
that the East Asian trajectory was a veritable miracle of capitalist development. 
More broadly, for many years the Bank has occupied a central international 
position in the production and dissemination of development knowledge about 
East Asia and the rest of the world. In concert with a number of other key, 
transnational regulatory agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Bank has also been instrumental in attempting to shape the overall contours of 
East Asia’ s political economy. Yet the World Bank’ s influence, and its 
understanding of development should not be conceptualised in monolithic terms.1   
 
Over time the conception of development encouraged by the Bank has shifted, 
mirroring wider trends in the international political economy. This article begins 
with a brief discussion of the changes in the World Bank’s understanding of 
development over the past 30 or 40 years. This is followed by an examination of 
the Bank’ s efforts to accommodate the East Asian trajectory within the dominant 
Anglo-American narrative on international development. It will be emphasised 
that the changes in the Bank’s understanding of capitalist development in East 
Asia have taken place in the context of the overall transformation of the 
international political economy since 1945. In short, the World Bank has been a 
major participant in the wider reinvention of liberalism which has been central to 
the history of the international development debate in the Cold War and post-cold 
War era.2 An examination of its historical role and the shifts in the model of East 
Asian development it has promoted tells us much about both the Bank and the 
wider international system of which it is an important part.  
 
Lineages of liberalism  
 
The World Bank and cold war liberalism 
 
The World Bank came into existence as part of the overall Bretton Woods system 
which emerged from the capitalist crisis, global war and reconstruction of the 
1930s and 1940s. The Bank – along with the IMF – was envisioned by the 
victorious allied powers as an instrument which could be used both to 
consolidate and manage the postwar international political economy.3 Not only 
was the Bank charged with providing the capital and expertise with which to kick-
start post-1945 reconstruction, it was also an important component in locking 
countries into a US-centred economic order – a critical consideration in the light 
of the emerging superpower rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, it is important to remember that, particularly in the immediate postwar 
period, the Soviet Union was widely seen as a serious alternative to the crisis-
ridden capitalist system which had been mired in the Great Depression before 
the outbreak of World War II.4 From its inception, therefore, the Bank was 
grounded in the wider power relations of the Cold War. This period saw the 
establishment of an elite liberal consensus about both the appropriate model of 
economic development and the best approach to the management of 
international economic relations.5 As time passed this consensus shifted, moving 
from what Ruggie has described as the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Keynesian-
inspired early Cold War era, to the neoliberal order that began to emerge in the 
1970s.6  
 
Before the 1970s the conception of, and approach to, development which 
emanated from the World Bank reflected the Keynesian consensus and the cold 
war liberalism (liberal developmentalism or classical modernisation theory) of the 
US political and economic elite. The overall strategy of the USA towards what 
became known after 1945 as the ‘developing world’ built on the experience of 
anti-communist reconstruction in Europe in the late 1940s and 1950s. The 1947 
effort to keep Greece and Turkey from succumbing to international communism 
relied on both military and economic aid. After the apparent success of the 
economic component of the containment strategy on the eastern fringe of 
Europe, the Marshall Plan was launched in 1948 with the aim of facilitating the 
rebuilding of Western Europe.7 The apparent success of anti-communist 
reconstruction in much of Europe, and latterly in Northeast Asia, contributed to 
‘the full flowering of liberal developmentalism’ in the 1960s, manifested most 
dramatically in the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and the US anti-
communist crusade in Vietnam.8 These influences were readily apparent during 
Robert McNamara’ s presidency (1968-81) of the Bank. McNamara had served 
as Secretary of Defense in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and 
was one of the key architects of the Vietnam War until his resignation in 1968, 
when he took up the presidency of the World Bank.9 The overall approach of 
McNamara and other cold war warriors of his generation was conditioned by the 
idea that the poverty of nation-states in Asia, Africa and Latin America was the 
key to the spread of communism. Into the 1970s the presumption that there was 
a direct link between poverty and revolution, and that the communist threat could 
be eliminated via the emulation of the approach to economic modernisation 
believed to have been followed in North America and Western Europe, was at 
the heart of the dominant international discourse on development.10 Under 
McNamara the World Bank significantly expanded its lending at the same time as 
the ‘alleviation of poverty’ was promoted as a major focus of the organisation’ s 
activity.  
 
The Bank in the McNamara era reflected some of the optimism characteristic of 
the wider cold war liberalism (liberal developmentalism or classical modernisation 
theory) which had emerged after 1945. For example, in the mid-1970s Hollis 
Chenery, the World Bank’ s Vice-President for Development Policy initiated a 
study of the Bank’ s record on economic development since 1950.11 Although the 
study was prepared by an outside consultant (David Morawetz) the conclusions it 
drew crystallised the official viewpoint of the Bank in the McNamara era. Overall 
the study, like the Bank in the 1970s, took the view that on a global scale 
economic growth had been rapid and dramatic; however, this growth continued 
to be very poorly distributed. The Morawetz report was confident to the point of 
complacency that the eradication of poverty is not likely to be just another fad’ , 
that the ‘problems of monoproduct economies’ could be mitigated, that excessive 
concern about debt problems was misplaced, and that the dramatic growth in 
commercial lending in the 1970s was not a cause for concern. Only with the 
second oil crisis (1979-80) did the Bank express any public reservations about 
the international financial system’ s ability to recycle enough funds to maintain 
economic growth and systemic stability.12 This, combined with anti-inflation 
policies of recently elected neo-liberal governments, such as the Thatcher 
administration in the UK, and the anticipation that energy prices might continue to 
rise dramatically throughout the 1980s, convinced McNamara that the world 
economy had undergone a permanent change. Once the perception of 
permanent change in the world economy took hold of the Bank in 1980, various 
other policy conclusions followed. While financial assistance to governments of 
developing countries had been used in the past as ‘a substitute for structural 
adjustment’ , it was increasingly used to ‘support structural adjustment’.13 Thus 
the changing international context allowed the Bank to use structural adjustment 
loans to lock recipient governments into a particular sort of politico-economic 
order, one that reflected both the interests and assumptions of its major 
sponsors.  
 
The World Bank and the neoliberal ascendancy  
 
In the early 1980s neoliberal governments (particularly the Reagan 
administration in the USA and the Thatcher administration in the UK) were in the 
ascendant in North America and Western Europe. The neoliberal ascendancy, 
however, did not flow from the inherent rationality of neoliberal policies - it was 
grounded in part in the apparent intractability of the economic and social 
problems of the 1970s. The apparent inability of the various governments in 
power in North America and Western Europe (and beyond) to deal with rising-
inflation was a central component of the rise of neoliberalism during the late 
1970s. Cold war revivalism played an equally important role in defence and 
foreign affairs; significantly, however, opposition to the new Cold War was more 
effective than opposition to neoliberal economics.14 More broadly, the emergence 
of neoliberalism as the dominant narrative on development was linked directly to 
the dramatic changes in the overall character of the international political 
economy in the 1980s. Neoliberalism seemed to offer simple solutions to the 
economic problems of the North American and Western European electorates, its 
programme meshing with the aims and assumptions of a complex array of 
transnational forces which were the motor and the main beneficiaries of the 
neoliberal (and emergent globalisation) project.15  
 
Significantly these wider shifts were marked by the end of McNamara’ s tenure 
as president of the World Bank. He was succeeded in 1981 by Alden Winship 
(Tom) Clausen. During Clausen’ s presidency (1981-86) the conception of 
development which had predominated at the Bank during the McNamara era was 
more or less erased. Clausen, whose previous position had been at the head of 
the Bank of America -  the biggest commercial bank in the world - made it clear 
to the World Bank’ s top executives at the outset that he had no intention of 
maintaining his predecessor’ s focus on poverty alleviation. Mahbub Ul Haq, a 
long-time Bank staffer and adviser to McNamara, suggests that Clausen, a 
proponent of supply-side economics, was adamant ‘that the only constituency 
that mattered was the United States’.16 During the 1980s poverty alleviation was 
‘demoted to priority zero’ with so-called structural adjustment policies taking its 
place.17 The dramatic shift in development thinking at the Bank was clearly 
represented by the Berg Report which was published in 1981. The official title of 
the Berg Report was Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action and was written by Elliot Berg.18 The report relied on insights 
drawn from rational choice theory to evaluate the developmental record of 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa. Its prescriptions centred on the need for a 
greatly reduced role for the state in the economy and much greater reliance on 
the market as a means of accelerating economic activity, particularly in the 
agricultural sector. However, it is misleading to view the Bank during Clausen’ s 
presidency as being united around the neoliberalism reflected in the Berg Report. 
Under Clausen the Bank experienced greater policy fragmentation and diversity 
than was the case during the McNamara era.  
 
In this period, for example, the research department of the World Bank was 
characterised by a particularly devout commitment to neoliberalism and an 
intolerance of dissent which was not necessarily shared by other sections of the 
Bank. After 1981 the research department’s operations and activities were 
devoted increasingly to ‘large projects designed to substantiate what everyone 
knew in their hearts already: that economic liberalization was right’.19 The head of 
the research department was Anne Krueger, whom Clausen had hired to replace 
Hollis Chenery, the Bank’ s chief economic theorist in the McNamara era. 
According to one insider, Krueger was not interested in debating economic policy 
and ‘she cut off anybody who ever had any relationship with Hollis Chenery’.20 
Nevertheless, staff on the operational side maintained a degree of pragmatism in 
their overall approach and policy prescriptions. Even during the early to mid-
1980s, which were by far the most doctrinaire, the World Bank did not become a 
neoliberal monolith, and ‘for every research report vindicating the neoliberal 
position, one could find another Bank publication which looked more soberly at 
the social and technological constraints on development’.21 For example, the 
World Development Report 1987, which focused on trade and industrialisation, 
outlined an approach to economic development that was particularly adamant in 
its commitment to neoliberalism;22 Four years later, however, in the 1991 World 
Development Report, entitled The Challenge of Development, it was emphasised 
that market-friendly policies - neither complete laissez faire nor interventionism - 
are optimal for growth and income distribution’.23  
 
The end of the high period of neoliberalism at the World Bank had been reached 
long before 1991, however. and was marked by the change of Presidents from 
Clausen to Barber Conable in 1986. During Conable’ s tenure as president 
(1986-91) the Bank was reorganised in an effort to make it more effective and 
smaller. Conable sought to reduce the organisation’s 6000 employees by 10% 
and break the influence of powerful long-time managers, particularly Ernest 
Stern, the economist who ‘had been the de facto power in the Bank since 
McNamara’s retirement’. The Bank certainly was shaken up in the months after 
Conable first took over, but even before Conable left the number of its staff had 
returned to 6000 and most of the powerful and long serving ‘politically attuned 
bureaucrats’ at the Bank remained in place. For example, Ernest Stern remained 
at the Bank long after Conable had retired.24 Nevertheless, while Conable was 
at the helm, the organisation’ s public image was seen to be more consensual 
than under Clausen, while poverty alleviation and the mitigation of the social 
costs of structural adjustment were given greater prominence. The neoliberal 
ideologues in the research department departed and the department itself 
disappeared as a separate Vice-Presidency in the reorganisation of 1987. 
However, as we will see, the World Bank’ s understanding of development into 
the 1990s continued to be, or increasingly became, influenced by rational choice 
theory (the new institutionalism and the new political economy), resulting in a 
highly mechanistic approach to the dynamics of political and economic change in 
the various countries which the researchers at the Bank sought to understand.25  
 
Despite the shifts in neoliberalism between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, 
the 1980s saw the institutional and discursive consolidation of market-centred 
ideas, something that the demise of the Soviet Union (1989-91) as the most 
serious challenger to the hegemony of Anglo-American-style capitalism simply 
served to reinforce. ‘Actually existing socialism’ in the Soviet Union and around 
the world had attempted from the beginning to ‘mimic the economic achieve- 
ments of capitalism’ , laying down objectives which capitalism was ‘obviously 
much better equipped than socialism to achieve’.26 However, the fall of state 
socialism by the end of the 1980s reinforced the process of neoliberal 
consolidation which drew considerable sustenance from the view that the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc was a victory for the particular type of capitalism that 
predominated in Britain and North America in the 1980s.27 This, combined with 
the idea that a new international consensus on development was in place by the 
early 1990s at the same time as the end of the Cold War, meant, in theory, that 
more concessions (or at least gestures) could be made in the direction of 
planning and the role of government, sustainable development issues and 
environmental concerns. This conjuncture was encapsulated in October 1991 in 
an opening address to the annual World Bank and IMF meeting in Bangkok by 
Conable’ s successor as president, Lewis Preston. In his speech the new 
president of the Bank asserted that the demise of the Soviet bloc had led to ‘the 
broad convergence of development thinking which has replaced ideological 
conflict’ , while a consensus based on the free-market, a balance between the 
private sector and government and sustainable economic growth was spreading 
around the globe.28 Ultimately the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the 
entrenchment of what Stephen Gill describes as ‘market civilization’ - the 
transformative practices by which capitalist expansion becomes bound up with a 
legitimating neoliberal discourse of progress and development.29 Importantly, 
although it is a movement which is reinforced by the application of the political 
power of key actors like the USA, at another level its most subtle quality has 
been the way in which market-mediated social relations have become integral to 
common sense understandings of development.30  
 
The World Bank and the international development debate  
 
The World Bank has occupied a central position in the wider consolidation of 
neoliberalism, as declarations such as Lewis Preston’ s remind us. The Bank is 
significant both as the source of authoritative knowledge about economic 
development and because of its key role in setting the agenda in the international 
development debate. This flows from its possession of an unrivalled budget for 
research and policy-formulation capacity in comparison to any other development 
organisation. At the same time, the World Bank is able to attract a high degree of 
international media attention for its pronouncements and major reports. This 
‘intellectual’ influence is directly reinforced by its economic leverage with 
governments around the world looking for investment, loans and foreign aid.31 
The ideas that form much of the Bank’ s policy agenda are also produced and 
disseminated in part by its own think-tank. Set up in 1956, using financial support 
from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Economic Development Institute 
(EDI) instructed people from a wide range of ‘developing countries’ in the 
creation and management of projects commensurate with the Bank’s overall 
conception of development. According to its first director, Sir Alexander 
Cairncross, the intention of the EDI was to ensure that by associating with and 
studying at the Bank, students ‘would carry with them ideas that were more 
congenial to the Bank when they went back to their own country’. Certainly, a 
number of EDI graduates have achieved positions of prominence in their 
countries of origin. In the late 1970s Cairncross observed that EDI graduates 
‘more or less ran’ South Korea, and in Pakistan there were ‘a great many ex-EDI 
men who quite consciously were pulling together and having an influence on 
development’.32  
 
The USA remains the Bank’ s most powerful member, although its position as a 
Bank shareholder is greatly reduced. However, the USA still chooses the head of 
the Bank and it is the only country with a veto over amendments to its Articles of 
Agreement. Furthermore, the USA closely monitors Bank activities, and is the 
only Bank member to review all loan proposals in detail: officials of the Treasury 
Department are in daily contact not only with the US executive director but with 
other Bank officials.33 By the 1950s Washington’ s geopolitical goals were 
consistently linked to the economic and financial reforms the World Bank and the 
IMF demanded of governments around the world. The US government has 
always been candid about this linkage. As one US official noted in the 1970s, the 
IMF and the World Bank ‘use their loans as leverage to encourage positive 
economic performance and acceptance of market economy principles in recipient 
countries’. It is clear that the USA has effectively dominated the World Bank, the 
IMF and their affiliates. As Kolko notes, over 40% of the World Bank’ s top 
managers are US citizens and the president has always been a US citizen (the 
most recent Australian-born president being something of an exception).34  
 
US influence is also grounded in the Bank’ s dependence on world financial 
markets, the central position of the USA as a global financial centre, and the 
closely aligned interests of key financial actors with those of US foreign policy. 
This influence is further entrenched in the Bank’s institutionalised norms and 
culture. At least 80% of the economists working for the World Bank are trained in 
the UK or North America. Their approach and outlook, and that of virtually all of 
the remaining 20%, is based on the assumptions and methodologies of Anglo-
American liberalism and neoclassical economic thought. Robert Wade argues 
that economists who do not subscribe to the main precepts of neoclassical 
economics are unlikely even to be employed by the Bank, while the small 
number of social scientists from other disciplines work for the Bank on peripheral 
projects and have no influence over economic policy formulation.35 Interestingly, 
before the 1960s the operations and overall approach to development which 
characterised the World Bank were driven in part by the preponderance of 
professional engineers within the institution and their vision of development as 
the funding and building of physical structures.36  
 
The current dominance of neoclassical economists within the upper echelons of 
the Bank is reinforced by its internal review process. Within the Bank, policy 
documents go through a process of review and evaluation moving upwards 
through the numerous echelons of the organisation. Each echelon works to 
narrow the overall perspective. It is not just that higher levels are more 
concerned with the Bank’ s and the system’ s integrity than with the integrity of 
the research. It is also that promotion criteria for the higher levels favour people 
who make decisions quickly and with closure, using ‘facts’ selectively to support 
preconceived patterns and convictions. This process is complemented by a 
conformist culture in which the Bank’ s prevailing editorial line is rigidly 
followed.37 This is especially significant given the sheer volume of the Bank’ s 
widely disseminated and authoritative research. Yet, despite the Bank’ s internal 
culture of conformity and the undoubted influence of mainstream economics on 
the literature that emerges from it, the Bank is not immune to external influences. 
Quite how potentially significant such influences can be is revealed by the shifts 
in the Bank’ s understanding of the East Asian trajectory.  
 
Miracles of modernisation  
 
The World Bank and the East Asian trajectory 
 
 By the 1980s, the World Bank, more than any other institution, was playing a key 
role in interpreting what was increasingly being viewed as the miraculous 
industrialisation of East Asia. Significantly, this interpretation was refracted 
through a pervasive framework of neoliberal ideas. The central prescription which 
the World Bank increasingly offered to governments in so-called developing 
countries was that underdevelopment was caused by excessive state 
intervention in the economy. It argued that privatisation and liberalisation would 
encourage economic growth and economic efficiency. To support their argument 
they pointed to countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which they characterised as exemplars of the success of the free-
market model, while pointing to the apparent failure of the public-interventionist 
model adopted by governments in Africa and Latin America.38  
 
The rise of the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) of East Asia was 
consequently interpreted as a natural outgrowth of capitalist expansion. One of 
the best known World Bank economists to consistently articulate a neoclassical 
interpretation of industrialisation in East Asia has been Bela Balassa. From 
Balassa’ s perspective, comparative advantage - or the idea that countries 
should specialise in what they are ‘naturally’ best at - is a key factor in economic 
development. From this point of view the natural unfolding of the world economy 
results in the movement of national economies from the production of low 
technology goods to the manufacture of higher technology goods, as a particular 
country’ s comparative advantage shifts unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing 
to skilled capital-intensive production.39 In the late 1980s Balassa argued that, 
with the exception of Hong Kong, the NIEs had all gone through an initial stage of 
import-substitution industrialisation, but in contrast to late industrialising nation-
states in Latin America, the East Asian NIEs had subsequently and successfully 
embraced export-orientated industrialisation. For Balassa, this external 
orientation was a central and dynamic element of the comparative advantage 
framework, insofar as an external orientation facilitated the overcoming of 
domestic constraints, undercutting monopolistic and protectionist economic 
arrangements, and encouraging competition and the pursuit of technological 
improvement.40 Fitting the rise of East Asia into an economic framework 
grounded in Anglo-American liberalism increasingly became not simply a 
theoretical challenge, but an inherently political exercise. Other prominent 
economists, operating within the ambit of Anglo-American liberalism, took pains 
to construct explanations that presented the success of even the most obviously 
state-led developmental trajectories, such as Japan, as primarily the result of 
market forces.41  
 
The attempt to depict the East Asian experience as essentially a ‘normal’ part of 
capitalist development that was in accord with the precepts of neoclassical 
economics was significant for several reasons. First, interpreting East Asian 
development as a lesson in neoclassical economics inevitably informed the 
policy initiatives of both regional governments and those outside agencies and 
actors like the Bank, the IMF and the USA, which sought to influence or deal with 
them. Second, it was significant because it increasingly flew in the face of an 
overwhelming amount of evidence detailing the attempts by various governments 
in East Asia to shape the content and direction of economic activity directly, 
rather than waiting passively for market forces to determine key economic 
outcomes. There is no intention here to review in depth the contending positions 
in this debate, nor the voluminous literature that accompanies it. Rather, it is 
sufficient to note that since the 1980s there has been an increasing number of 
‘revisionist’ Anglo-American policy-orientated works which attempts to challenge 
the dominant neoliberal approach to economic development and emphasise the 
role of the state in capitalist development.42 This literature, and approaches to 
and perceptions of the East Asian experience which originate from within the 
region generally, bear little resemblance to the vision of East Asia conjured up by 
neoclassical economists and the avatars of Anglo-American liberalism. Not only 
does the lineage of ‘Asian’ economic ideas owe more to the formulations of 
Friedrich List than it does to Adam Smith, but there are highly distinctive regional 
views about the character and purpose of capitalist organisation, and the place of 
a more assertive East Asian region and its distinctive patterns of political and 
economic organisation more generally.43  
 
The World Bank and the struggle for the East Asian model  
 
Even if the relative success of the state-led East Asian development trajectory is 
in question, states in the region clearly acted as if intervention was likely to be 
efficacious, effectively undermining both the normative and theoretical aspects of 
neoclassical economics. Furthermore, as we shall see, the Bank itself has come 
to accept that state intervention has played a key role in regional development. 
Thus, despite the continuity in basic assumptions, the Bank’ s views on East Asia 
and on economic development more generally. have been influenced by the 
wider international situation of which they are a part. This is readily apparent in 
the case of the now famous 1993 World Bank report entitled The East Asian 
Miracle.44 The 1993 report was funded by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and 
carried out in the context of ongoing efforts by the Japanese government to get 
the World Bank to revise its commitment to a neoliberal model of development, 
and by implication, to take the Japanese alternative more seriously.45 Thus, the 
East Asian Miracle report was a profoundly political document produced out of a 
complex struggle within the Bank and between the Bank and the Japanese 
government. While the Japanese government was not happy with the final 
product, the 1993 report was significant in that, for the first time in a major Bank 
publication, it conceded that government intervention had played some role in 
economic development in most of East Asia.46  
 
Pressure for such a concession, if not a more dramatic acknowledgment of the 
role of the state in economic development, had been building throughout the 
1980s. Despite the growing international influence of neoliberalism, the Japanese 
government continued to ‘intervene’ in economic activity in a manner that flouted 
the rising neoliberal narrative. This ensured that it was increasingly subject to 
criticism in the context of apparently interminable trade disputes with the USA.47 
During the 1980s the Japanese government continued to direct or assist the 
expansion of Japanese corporations overseas.48 In 1987, for example, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) planned a regional 
industrialisation strategy for the governments of Southeast Asia, a key element of 
which was the allocation of ‘directed credit’. At the end of the 1980s, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) set up the ASEAN-Japan Development 
Fund, which was administered by Japan’ s main aid agency and sought to 
provide credit to the private sector. Officials at the World Bank conveyed their 
concern about this approach through informal channels, but had no discernible 
effect. Meanwhile, in June 1989, Masaki Shiratori became the World Bank’ s new 
Executive Director for Japan. The Japanese government was the second ranking 
shareholder in the World Bank (after the USA) and Shiratori, a senior MOF 
official, was ‘determined to make the Bank pay more attention to the East Asian 
experience’ generally, rethink direct credit policies, and take the Japanese and 
East Asian approaches to industrialisation and development seriously.49  
 
The potential for increased conflict over competing visions of regional 
development was exacerbated by the appointment, in January 1991, of 
Lawrence Summers to the position of chief economist and vice-president at the 
Bank. Summers, a Harvard academic, was well known for dismissing Japanese 
economists as ‘second rate’. At the same time, it was Summers who came up 
with the term ‘market friendly’, which was used to soften the overall free-market 
approach of the final version of the World Development Report 1991: The 
Challenge to Development.50 Not surprisingly, the terminological change did little 
to mollify the concerns of the Japanese government, which continued to promote 
its own model of economic development using its increasing power in the Bank 
and the IMF as leverage.51 In an address at the World Bank and the IMF’ s Board 
of Governors annual meeting in October 1991, Yasushi Mieno, then head of the 
Bank of Japan, argued that the East Asian experience demonstrated the 
significance of government intervention. In his speech, which had been drafted 
by the Ministry of Finance’ s International Finance Bureau, he made an explicit 
appeal for the IMF and the World Bank to initiate a ‘wide-ranging study that 
would define the theoretical underpinning of this approach and clarify the areas in 
which it can be successfully applied to other parts of the globe’.52 At the same 
meeting the World Bank’ s vice-president and managing director, Attila 
Karaosmanoglu suggested that the NIEs of East Asia ‘and their successful 
emulators are a powerful argument that a more activist. positive governmental 
role can be a decisive factor in rapid industrial growth’, concluding that ‘what is 
replicable and transferable must be brought to light and shared with others’.53  
 
However, many officials at the World Bank viewed the Japanese model as a 
threat for a number of reasons. In the first instance, the concessionary credit 
which was part of the Japanese approach to development aid undermined the 
attractiveness of credit provided by the World Bank. Second, the emphasis on 
the importance of directed credit as an instrument of industrial policy which is 
characteristic of the Japanese approach is at odds with the Bank’s overarching 
focus on financial liberalisation. The upper echelons of the Bank also feared that, 
if they put their imprimatur on the developmental state model, it would undermine 
the Bank’s own credit rating (and therefore borrowing and lending capacity) with 
the international money markets and its authority in the international economic 
system more generally. For the Bank to change its attitude towards the Japanese 
model would also represent a major challenge to the USA, which has historically 
used the Bank in its overall projection of power and influence. From the point of 
view of the World Bank, the Japanese model also gives legitimacy to the 
‘interventionist impulses’ which exist among the governments and elites of the 
various countries which are beholden to the World Bank. Ultimately, for those 
looking out on the world from the commanding heights of the World Bank, the 
Japanese model was a ‘systemic threat’ to the status quo.54  
 
It is not surprising, then, that although the East Asian Miracle report 
acknowledged that the state had, and could, play a role in economic 
development, it continued to emphasise that the ‘essence of the miracle’ involved 
‘getting the basics right’.55 Furthermore, it continued to treat economic 
development as a technical policy question, in which the role of the state (or 
government institutions) was not seen as particularly relevant to an overall 
understanding of successful capitalist development, even if it was important to 
particular economic activities at particular times. However, even as the role of the 
state was being acknowledged, but downplayed, by the World Bank - to the 
annoyance of the Japanese sponsors of the 1993 report - the way was being 
paved for greater accommodation of the state-centred perspective in the context 
of the wider and ongoing reinvention of liberalism.  
 
The World Bank, the state and the reinvention of liberalism  
 
At the end of the 1980s, the Bank began to produce a series of reports in which 
the idea of ‘good governance’ was critical.56 Again, the focus was increasingly on 
a search for supposedly optimal forms of economic management, rather than 
positing capitalism as a paradigmatic rival to a declining or defunct state-socialist 
alternative. Although the World Bank’ s conception of development in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War had broadened somewhat in the changed 
political context, it also began to take on an increasingly ‘technical’ aspect.57 The 
concept of good governance which emerged in this period depicted the 
relationship between the political and the economic in a way which clearly 
reflected the influence of predominantly Anglo-American political thought and the 
essentially liberal notion of state neutrality.58 As critics have been quick to point 
out, the Bank’ s interest in governance issues and its apolitical conception of the 
state allowed the bank to promote market-orientated reforms without necessarily 
challenging established elites whose position and power might be threatened by 
more serious calls for political reform.59 Nevertheless, the growing emphasis on 
good governance helped to pave the way for greater attention to the state. 
Significantly, the notion of good governance has been taken up by elites in many 
parts of the world, including East Asia. Tommy Koh, former Singaporean 
representative to the United Nations, head of the Asia-Europe Foundation and a 
well known advocate of Asian values, has argued that the development of a 
shared conception of, and commitment to, good governance would help ground 
wider East-West relations.60  
 
The overall process of revising liberalism in a way which incorporates the 
technocratic and elitist notion of good governance, and which accommodates the 
state-led development trajectory of East Asia to neo-classical economics, is 
clearly apparent in The Key to the Asian Miracle which was published in 1996. 
Although not a World Bank publication as such, the book was written by JoseÂ 
Edgardo Campos, a World Bank economist and co-author of the 1993 Miracle 
report, and Hilton L Root an economic historian based at the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford University. In their book, they attempt to outline ‘concrete lessons for 
the rest of the developing world’ by examining ‘the rationality of the structure and 
performance’ of key institutions in East Asia. From their point of view, although 
East Asian institutions are not necessarily ‘directly transferable’ to other nation-
states, knowing how they operate can still provide a ‘guide’ for other 
governments facing similar economic problems.61 Their analysis, which clearly 
reflects the influence of rational choice theory (the new institutionalism and/or the 
new political economy) represents the high-performing Asian economies, or 
HPAEs, (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia) as variations of a generalised form of enlightened and 
paternalistic authoritarianism. They argue that the governments of the HPAEs 
were aware that successful economic development necessitated coordinating the 
‘expectations’ of various groups. This led to the crafting of institutional 
arrangements that sought to distribute ‘the benefits of growth-enhancing policies 
widely’, while reassuring businesses and individuals ‘that they would share the 
growth dividend’. In the prescriptive tone which pervades their study, they 
emphasise that ‘sharing gave the less fortunate a stake in the economy’. This 
worked to discourage ‘disruptive activities’ and reduced ‘the risk of regime 
failure’. Importantly, it also allowed the various governments to focus ‘on 
promoting rational economic policies by reducing the need to constantly contend 
with issues of redistribution’.62  
 
The authors observe that the East Asian regimes which have presided over the 
successful economic growth of the past decades are regularly regarded ‘as 
authoritarian, even dictatorial’. They argue that this perception is misleading and 
‘occurs largely because of the failure of Western observers to recognise in East 
Asia systems for ensuring accountability and consensus building that differ from 
Western-style institutions’. They emphasise that ‘the mechanisms that 
Westerners expect to see -  written constitutions, elected legislators, a formal 
system of checks and balances -  are but one set of solutions to establishing 
regime legitimacy and guaranteeing limits on government action’. From their 
point of view they have made clear that there are ‘other ways of’ mobilising 
‘public support’ and ‘restraining ruling cliques from overriding the economic rights 
of others’. Furthermore, although the different HPAEs vary significantly from each 
other, they ‘share enough common elements to suggest a developmental model 
that differs from the trajectory of the Western democracies and from the 
autocracies of the past and present’. According to the authors, instead of 
behaving ‘like roving bandits’ the regimes of the HPAEs ‘have considered the 
future output of society and have offered incentives to productive investment 
(physical and human) that are typically found only in the Western democracies’. 
They conclude that, while the future for the HPAEs is uncertain and the historical 
context (the Cold War in particular) has altered, the governments of ‘developing’ 
nations around the world can still benefit from an examination of the HPAEs as a 
way of finding ‘their own best starting points’.63 
 
In the wider context of the ‘discovery’ of the state in East Asia, which is apparent 
in works such as The Key to the Asian Miracle, the process of liberal revisionism 
begun in the Bank’ s original Miracle report, has been more completely realised 
in The State in a Changing World, published with much fanfare in 1997.64 Indeed, 
so significant a departure is this report from the organisation’ s earlier position, 
that it provides an obvious marker of the ongoing reinvention of liberalism in 
which the Bank has played an important role. The State in a Changing World was 
not simply a product of the rising economic, and therefore political, influence of 
the developmental states of East Asia, it was also made possible by the 
transformation of the international political economy itself. As has already been 
suggested, the dominance of capitalism as the unchallenged - by rival systemic 
paradigms, at least - form of global economic organisation, profoundly altered the 
situation in which debates about economic development occurred. Given that it 
was no longer necessary to justify capitalist organisation in opposition to a rival 
economic system, it was, perhaps, inevitable that capitalism, or more precisely 
alternative models of capitalism, would be the subject of greater examination at 
the same time as it was possible in the post-cold war era to give greater credit to 
the different type(s) of capitalism which had been so successful in East Asia.65  
 
In this context The State in a Changing World is a noteworthy and revealing 
example of the Bank’ s shifting position on the role of the state. Indeed, the entire 
report is premised on the idea that the state is not simply a necessarily important 
determinant of national economic welfare, but that ‘its capability - defined as the 
ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently - must be 
increased’.66 Clearly, this bears the hallmarks of an extremely influential strand of 
predominantly North American theoretical literature centred on rational choice 
economics and the increasingly prominent position of institutional theory.67 What 
is of more general significance, however, is that although much of this literature 
still carries the same sort of commitment to market-determined economic 
outcomes as does neoclassical economics, the report’ s recognition of the 
potential efficacy of state intervention marks a significant departure from its 
previous position and an overt recognition of the role of government ‘intervention’ 
in the rise of East Asia.  
 
Although the report is at pains to describe the actions of Japan and the East 
Asian states more generally as ‘market enhancing’ , it also clearly concedes that 
states are fundamentally implicated in defining the structure of market-mediated 
economic relations.68 In other words, ‘intervention’ per se is not necessarily a 
problem. Indeed, ‘development without an effective state is impossible’ according 
to the report.69 East Asia assumes a particular significance in this regard as it 
‘shows how government and the private sector can cooperate to achieve rapid 
growth and shared development’.70 What this amounts to is an - albeit heavily 
qualified - endorsement of the ‘Asian way’ of managing government-business 
relations in particular and the process of development more generally. For the 
late-industrialising nations of East Asia, and by implication for their counterparts 
in the rest of the so-called ‘developing world’, the report concludes that the state 
is capable of ‘not merely laying the foundations of industrial development but 
actually accelerating it’,71 At the same time, the World Bank’ s 1997 report 
defines an ‘effective state’ in a way which bypasses the wider social context and 
the social impact of the developmental states in the region. Not surprisingly, as 
with Campos’ and Roots’ 1996 study, the conception of an effective state in East 
Asia presented in The State in a Changing World is grounded in an elite-centred 
approach to political and economic change which implicitly, if not explicitly, 
endorses authoritarianism.72  
 
Nevertheless, The State in a Changing World represents something of a 
watershed for the Bank and reflects a shift in neoliberalism the significance of 
which is not yet clear. While the type of development knowledge produced by the 
World Bank has been influenced by a growing literature on the importance and 
role of institutions, it is also clearly influenced by wider forces in the international 
political economy. The direct and increasing influence of the Japanese 
government on the one hand, and what had until recently been the remarkable 
rise of East Asia more generally on the other, has clearly been reflected in the 
type of development knowledge produced at the Bank. The crucial question for 
the future, however, is whether this new-found enthusiasm for the state will 
survive the sudden collapse of the region into economic chaos. The history of the 
Bank has demonstrated that its position is likely to be determined by the shifting 
contours of the international political economy of which it is an integral part. The 
dominant economic discourse on the regional crisis attributes the apparent fall of 
East Asia to precisely the sorts of ‘cooperative, relations between business and 
government that the World Bank had so recently begun to endorse.73 Rather than 
being seen as a source of effective planning and economic development, the 
governments of East Asia are now routinely associated with cronyism, corruption 
and inefficiency.  
 
Ironically, having brought itself to concede that ‘the state’ (albeit a generally 
abstract and nonspecific one) can play a critical role in accelerating development, 
the Bank is now faced with the prospect of seeing this model become 
increasingly discredited. This does not mean, however, that the Bank’ s position 
will simply revert to the model of development, and the free-trade understanding 
of the East Asian trajectory, it championed in the early 1980s. Significantly, 
during the current crisis there has been a marked divergence between the 
approach taken by the Bank and that of its sibling, the IMF, which has taken a 
much more prominent role in attempts to manage the crisis.74 While these 
differences should not be exaggerated, and there is no suggestion that the Bank 
is not supportive of the general trend towards market-orientated reform and the 
pursuit of more ‘transparent’ economic relations in the region, nevertheless, the 
Bank has questioned the IMF approach. The standard IMF crisis-management 
toolkit of fiscal stringency, reduced spending and the like, has caused massive 
social dislocation, of which the Bank - or more accurately, its current president, 
James Wolfensohn - has been a significant critic.75 It is important not to read too 
much into the actions of one individual, no matter how senior in the Bank 
hierarchy, but Wolfensohn has also been an outspoken critic both of the way the 
Bank itself has operated and of its alienation from those whom it is supposedly 
intended to help. However, given the Bank’ s track record, we should be sceptical 
about the latest president’ s rhetoric of ‘people first’.76 In the short term 
Wolfensohn may have given the Bank’ s senior managers a shock, by forcing 
them actually to go into the field and examine the impact of the Bank’ s policies 
and prescriptions, for example.77 But it is extremely doubtful that such measures 
will alter the overall path of an organisation like the World Bank, which is 
profoundly implicated in the technocratic and elitist conception of development 
that remains the dominant international approach to development on the eve of 
the new millennium.  
 
Conclusion: lineages of liberalism and miracles of modernisation  
 
The 1997 crisis in East Asia has seriously undermined the region’ s credentials 
as the site of an economic miracle and has had a dramatic impact on the post-
cold war international political economy. As with the end of the Cold War, the end 
of the East Asian miracle has precipitated important changes in the contours of 
global capitalism. And as with the end of the Cold War, the possible end, or 
stalling of the East Asian miracle will undoubtedly lead to a great deal of 
revisionism on the part of those who had previously seen it as a potentially 
universal key to economic development. Between the 1970s and the second half 
of the 1990s the debate about the causes of, and the lessons which can be 
extracted from, the successful industrialisation of a growing number of countries 
in Northeast and Southeast Asia occupied a key position in the wider 
international development debate. During this period some of the most influential 
interpretations of East Asian industrialisation, which represented the East Asian 
trajectory as a miracle of modernisation, were linked to the wider rise of 
neoliberalism in this period. This was readily apparent in the interpretation of the 
East Asian miracle specifically, and capitalist development more generally, 
offered by the World Bank, arguably the most prestigious and one of the most 
powerful producers of international development knowledge. Taking the dramatic 
events of 1997 as a crucial turning point, this article has provided a brief 
overview of the relationship between Anglo-American liberalism and East Asian 
dynamism over the past 30 years or so. Ultimately, it was emphasised that, in the 
context of the shifting contours of the international political economy and 
important changes to the dominant international discourse on development, the 
World Bank played a crucial role in domesticating the East Asian Miracle to the 
dominant liberal narrative of progress and in facilitating the wider reinvention of 
liberalism in the post-1945 period.  
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